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THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR LAW IN KENTUCKY
By GEORGE NF 'F STmwENS*
In view of the growing importance of labor law in the
United States, it is advisable that the lawyers of each state
become familiar with the status of labor decisions and statutes in
their own home state. The National Labor Relations Act and the
Fair Standards Act have accelerated the need. While these acts
relate to and control labor problems in the field of interstate
commerce, they are already influencing intrastate labor problems.
It is the purpose of this article to present as concisely as possible
a study of the case and statutory law in Kentucky bearing on
labor problems, to the end that the lawyers and laymen of the
state, knowing what has been done, may see more clearly what
must be done in this field of growing importance.
LABOR'S RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
The rigbit of laborers to organize in order to achieve their
mutual aims was won in Kentucky at an early date. The story
of the fight is depicted in the cases that have reached the Court
of Appeals. It was a comparatively easy victory. Legal conten-
tions, which might have been used to delay tthe achievement of
the right to organize, were frequently so strongly attacked by
obiter of the highest court, obviously sympathetic with the
struggles of the laboring man, that their use was successfully
discouraged in advance.
CONSPIRACY
A. Common Law Conspiracy
A study of the early history of collective labor action reveals
that one of the first, and for many years a most successful
weapon used against combinations of laborers was the criminal
charge of common law conspiracy. The illegality condemned by
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville, School of
Law; A.B. 1931, Dartmouth College (cum laude); LL.B. 19315, Cornell
University; Instructor in law, University of Louisville, 1936-37; Assist-
ant Professor of Law, 1937-38; Associate Professor of Law since 1938.
Sabbatical leave, University of Michigan, 1939-40.
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the law was deemed to arise from the mere existence of a
combination.'
No attempt has ever been made in this state to defeat the
right of laborers to organize on the grounds that such combina-
tion constitutes a conspiracy at common law. The reason for
this, in all probability, may be traced to the decisions in Sayre v.
Louisville Uzion Benevolent Association,2 in 1863, and Aetna
Insurance Co. v. The Commonwealth,3 in 1889. The first case
was an action for damages for breach of contract by the Associa-
tion against Sayre. It appears that Sayre had violated certain
by-laws of the Association. Sayre's defense was to the effect
that the contract between the Association and himself was illegal
as a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and therefore, not binding.
In the opinion, the court saw fit to discuss at length the question
whether a combination of workmen to raise wages constituted a
conspiracy at common law. The court opined that it was not,
basing its decision on the famous case of Commonwealth v.
Hunt.
4
In the second of these cases, the defendant insurance com-
pany was indicted for conspiracy arising out of a combination
on the part of the defendant insurance company and others to
maintain rates. The court was called upon to define the crime
of conspiracy. In an elaborate opinion the court reviewed the
development of the elements of this crime and concluded by
adopting the language of Mr. Wright, that:
"There appears to be no evidence that during the first of these
periods (A.D. 1200 to 1600) any other crime of conspiracy or combina-
tion was known to the common law than that which was authoratively
and 'finally' defined in A.D. 1305 by the ordinance of conspirators (33
Edw. 1), as consisting in confederacy or alliance for the false and
malicious promotion of indictments, and pleas, or for embracery or
maintenance of various kinds."5'
I Rex v. Journeymen Tailors, 8 Mod. 10 (1721); Hawkins, Pleas
of the Crown, bk. 1, c. 72, See. 2 (1716). Case of the Philadelphia
Cordwainers, discussed by Professor Nelles in "The First American
Labor Case", 41 Yale L. J. 165 (1931).
62 Ky. 143, 1 Duv. 143 (1863).
3 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624 (1899).
'4 Mete. 111 (Mass., 1842), see Nelles, "Commonwealth v. Hunt",
32 Col. 1L. R. 1128 (1932).
This quotation was from Mr. Wright's "Law of Criminal Con-
spiracies", (1873). Mr. Wright was an eminent author in this field in
his day. However, subsequent research has tended to bring to light
additional materials of such a nature as to seriously undermine the
basis of Mr. Wright's contentions. See Landis, in the Historical Intro-
duction to his "Cases on Labor Law" (1934) at pp. 3-7.
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It is submitted that such a definition of the crime of con-
spiracy, combined -with the favorable attitude of the court
towards the organization of laborers found in the Sayre case,
and reiterated in the Aetna case, precluded, once and for all,
any attack on labor from this angle.
B. Conspiracy of Laborers
In its early years, also, tbe attempts of labor to organize met
active opposition at the hands of the legislature. Thus in
England, in the year 1548, Parliament enacted the Bill of Con-
spiracies of Victuallers and Craftsmen, imposing heavy penalities
upon "any artificers, workmen or labourers [who] do conspire,
covenant, or promise together, or make any oaths, that they shaUl
not make or do their work but at a certain price of rate, or shall
not enterprise or take upon them to finish that another hath be-
gun, or shall do but a certain work in a day, or shall not work
but at certain hours and times."
This particular act is of importance in this state, because of
the provision of the Kentucky Constitution, in See. 233, to the
effect that:
"All laws which on the first day of June, one thousand seven hun-
dred and ninety-two, were in force in the state of Virginia, and which
are of a general nature, and not local to that state, and not repugnant
to this constitution, nor to the laws which have been enacted by gen-
eral assembly of the Commonwealth, shall be enforced in this state
until they shall be altered or repealed by the general assembly."
In considering what laws were in force in Virginia, so as
to be a part of the law of Kentucky, under this provision, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals has ruled as follows:
"But only such principles and rules as constituted a part of the
common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I are, or
ever were, in force in this state. This is clearly implied in the Act
of 1776. To declare that the common law and statutes enacted prior
to that time should be in force was equivalent to declaring that no
rule of the common law not then recognized and in force in England
should be recognized and enforced here. James I ascended the throne
of England in 1603 (March 24th) and the fourth year of his reign com-
menced March 24, 1607; and when it is sought to enforce in this state
any rule of English common law, as such, independent of its soundness
in principle, it ought to appear that it was established and recognized
as the law of England prior to the latter date."8
A careful survey of thje statute law of Kentucky failed to
OAetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624
(1899).
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reveal any action of the General Assembly expressly adopting
any policy similar to that of the English Parliament above set
forth. However, in the year 1810 there appeared a three volume
work, containing all the statute law of Kentucky, compiled by
one William Littell. In the Appendix to the second volume,
entitled "A Collection of All the Acts of Parliament and Acts
of Virginia of a General Nature, which remain in force in the
State of Kentucky, etc.", at page 546, there appears the
following:
"2 & 3 Edward VI, Chap. 15, AD. 1548.
Conspiracy of Victuallers and Craftsmen.
It is enacted by the king our sovereign lord, the lords and com-
mons in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the
same, that if any butchers, brewers, bakers, poulterers, costermongers
or fruiterers, shall at any time from and after the first day of March
next coming, conspire, covenant, promise, or make any oaths that they
shall not sell their victuals but at a certain price, or if any artificers,
workmen, or labourers, do conspire, covenant or promise together, or
make any oaths that they shall not make or do their works but at a
certain price or rate, or shall not enterprize or take upon them to finish
that another hath begun, or shall do but certain work in a day, or shall
not work but at certain hours and times, that then every person so
conspiring, covenanting, swearing, or offending, being lawfully con-
victed thereof . . . (shall be punished)."
"II. And if it fortune any such conspiracy, covenant or promise,
to be had and made by any society, brotherhood or company of any
craft, mystery or occupation of the victuallers above mentioned, with
the presence or consent of the more part of them, that then, immediate-
ly upon such act of conspiracy, covenant or promise had or made, over
and besides the particular punishment, before in this act appointed
for the offender, their corporation shall be dissolved to all intents,
constructions and purposes."7
Section One of the above also appears in "A Digest of the
Statute Law of Kentucky, Being a Collection of all the Acts of
the General Assembly of a Public and Permanent Nature, also
the English and Virginia Statutes yet in force, etc." by William
Little and Jacob Swigert.8 Section Two of the above was
omitted. None of the other numerous digests of Kentucky
statutes has included any part of the English statute under
consideration. The works themselves give no explanation why
this particular statute was included in the appendix to the first
compilation of Kentucky statutes, and excluded thereafter, first
in part, then in full, in later compilations. Naturally, the
belief by William Littell that this statute was a part of the com-
"William Littell, "The Statute Law of Kentucky" (3 Vol., 1810),
Vol. II, pp. 6, 7, 8.
'(2 Vol., 1882.) In Vol. 1, at p. 292.
K. L. J.-5
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mon law of Kentucky would not be binding. So also, its later
omission by other compilers is not conclusive evidence that it is
not a part of Kentucky common law. The question-Is this
statute of Conspiracy of Victuallers and Craftsmen a part of
the common law of Kentucky ?-has never been directly raised.
However, the Court of Appeals did discuss it in great detail in
the case of Aetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, above
mentioned.
As previously noted, that case raised the question-What
constitutes a conspiracy? The Kentucky court recognized, in
view of section 233 of the Constitution, above referred to, that
the common law of Kentucky included both English judicial
decisions and dicta, and English statutory law, in force prior to
March 24, 1607. The attitude of the court towards the judge-
made law of conspiracy, as of that time, has already been
mentioned. With respect to the statutory law, in its discussion,
the court stated:
"At the time we adopted the English law, the statutes passed in
the time of the sixth Edward were in full force, which forbade all con-
spiracies and covenants of artificers, workmen or laborers not to make
or do their work but at a certain price or rate. . . . But so far as
we are informed, the right of workmen to combine for an increase
or maintenance of their wages by lawful means has never been held
unlawful in this Commonwealth. The statutes of Henry, Edward, and
Elizabeth upon that subject, so far as the Kentucky authorities show,
have always been as dead as they were in England after the Act of
1875 "
In view of this attitude on the part of the Court of Appeals
it becomes apparent why the opponents of organized labor never
made a direct attack on this ground.9
' In view of the actual parties before the court, the court's discus-
sion of whether the English statutes mentioned were a part of the
Kentucky common law must be considered as mere dictum. However,
the court did suggest the treatment that would be given on direct
attack. It should be noted that in Sec. 233 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion there appears the provision that only those laws "not local to
that state" shall be the law of this Commonwealth. The argument that
the statutes under consideration were local to England, in view of their
economic origin and purpose, is suggested in that part of the opinion
wherein the Court pointed out that although the statutes of Edward
VI, adopted in 1552, against forestallers and regrators, were in force at
the time Virginia got its common law, still Virginia found it necessary
to pass specific provisions against such traffic in order to obtain foods
for the Revolutionary army.
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JuDICIAL RECOGNITION OF LABOR'S RIGHT TO ORGAIIZE
Thus were the possibilities of attack on charges of criminal
conspiracy eliminated. As a result, labor had won, beyond the
shadow of a doubt, the right to organize. That it would, and that
it did, may be more graphically illustrated by quoting from vari-
ous opinions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. As early as
1863, in Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Association, 0
the Court of Appeals ruled that:
. . . as a workman who is bound by no contract, may lawfully
demand any wages that he may choose, any number of workmen may
lawfully combine for the same purpose .
In 1899, in Aetna Insurance Co. v. The Commonwealth,"
appears this significant statement:
. . . But, so far as we are informed, the right of workingmen
to combine for an increase or maintenance of their wages by lawful
means has never been held unlawful in this Commonwealth. "
Continuing, in 1912, in Saulsberry v. Cooper's International
Union,12 the court said:
The right of laborers to organize for protection . . .
has been many times before the courts of this country, and such right
has been uniformly upheld. . .
Again in 1920, in Diamond Block Coal Jo. v. United Min
Workers of America,'8 it is stated that:
"Labor organizations have a status in this country the same as
other associations. Courts without exception have recognized the
right of laboring men to associate themselves together to better their
conditions and to increase their wages by lawful means. .
"Capital may lawfully organize for its advancement and protec-
tion. It does so every day. Labor may rightfully do the same thing.
This Is the American way-the best-known way. . . "
One last example, from Aulich v. Craigmyle,14 decided in 1933,
where the court said:
"The right of workmen to form unions . . . is so well settled,
the question is not now a debatable one."
However, new obstacles to hamper the use by labor of its
new-found power through organization, were already in the
wind.
"62 Ky. 143, 1 Duv. 143 (1863).
106 Ky. 894, 51 S.W. 624 (1899).
" 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
"188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
"248 Ky. 676, 59 S.W. (2d) 560 (1933).
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ORGANIZED LABOR'S RIGHT TO USE ITS POWER
During the nineteenth century the law of criminal con-
spiracy, as applied to labor organization, became more and more
restricted, both in England and America, as a result of both
statutory enactment and case law. As a result, the opponents
of organized labor turned to other devices. In this connection
the possibilities of the doctrine of restraint of trade,15 the
development of the tort of civil conspiracies,1' and a new twist
to the doctrine of inducing breach of contract,17 were of great
significance.
If a court found that the agreement of any particular com-
bination was in restraint of trade, then that agreement would
be unenforceable.'5
If a court found a conspiracy to injure, resulting in damage,
civil liability followed.19 Whether or not a combination of
laborers constituted a conspiracy to injure turned on the pur-
pose of the combination in the eyes of the court. If the purpose
was held to be to promote its own trade interests, then it was
held proper, regardless of resulting injury.20 If the purpose
was held to be "to injure the party in his trade as distinguished
from the intention of legitimately advancing their own
interests", then, if damages resulted, civil liability arose.21
'sLandis, "Cases on Labor Law" (1934), Historical Introduction,
p. 19.
10 Landis, supra, note 15, at p. 24.
= Landis, supra, note 15, at p. 25.
Hilton v.. Eckersley, 6 El. & BI. 47 (1856). But see criticism of
language of Crompton, J., in Hilton v. Eckersley, in the opinion of
Bowen, L.J., in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., L.R.,
23 Q.B.D. 598 (1899).
20 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in detail the
development of this theory. It is suggested that for further informa-
tion one read the material in Landis, Historical Introduction to "Cases
on Labor Law" (1934), pages 19 and 24, and examine the English cases
of Allen v. Flood, (1898) A.C. 1; Mogul Steamship Co. v. MacGregor,
Gow & Co., (1899) L.R., 23 Q.B.D. 598; Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) A.C.
495; Sorrell v. Smith, (1925) A.C. 700. See also, Arkansas Wholesale
Grocers Assn. v. F.T,C., 18 F. (2d) 866 (8th C., 1927), cert. den., 275
U. S. 533 (1927). For articles, see, Freund, "Malice and Unlawful Inter-
ference", 11 Harv. L.R. 449 (1898); Ames, "How Far an Act May be a
Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor", 18 Harv. L.R. 411
(1905); Walton, "Motive as an Element in the Common and in the
Civil Law", 22 Harv. L. I. 501 (1909) ; Lewis, "Should the Motive of the
Defendant Affect the Question of his Liability", 5 Col. L.R. 107 (1905),
and 37 Harv. L.R. 143 (1923).
2Allen v. Flood, (1898) A.C. 1.
2 Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) A.C. 495.
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The new twist on the doctrine of inducing breach of con-
tract, as applied to organized labor, developed in England in
1905-1906.22 In these years the House of Lords decided that
ordinary union objectives were not sufficient justification for
inducing breach of contracts of service without consequent
liability.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The doctrine of Restraint of Trade is a limited one. Wrote
Bowen, L.J., in Mogul Steamship Jo. v. McGregor, Gow & C0.23:
. . . Contracts, as they are called, in restraint of trade, are
not, in my opinion, illegal in any sense, except that the law will not
enforce them. . .. No action at common law will lie or ever has
lain against any individual or individuals for entering into a contract
merely because it is in restraint of trade.
In other words, the courts go only so far as to release one or
more contracting parties from an otherwise valid agreement on
the ground that the contract is in restraint of trade. The
applicability of the doctrine, therefore, is limited to situations
in which one or more contracting parties have failed to live up
to their promises. As a weapon in industrial dispute, this doc-
trine is of limited value. This would account for the paucity of
cases involving the doctrine in Kentucky. Only two cases of
interest to us on this point, have reached the Court of Appeals.
The first was Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Association,24
decided in 1863. Member Sayre had violated a by-law of the
Association to the effect that no member "shall go into any river
or trade and work for less than the wages, nor take, bargain for,
or carry any freight for less than the established rate in the
trade". This action was brought to collect damages for the
breach. The court denied Sayre's liability, ruling that the
by-law involved was in restraint of trade, and therefore,
unenforceable. The invalidity of the by-law, said the court, was
not because it bound men not to work unless they could get a
reasonable price for their labor, but because the by-law failed
to make provision that the rate established be reasonable, from
the viewpoint of the public, as well as the parties.
"South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., (1905)
A.C. 239, and Danaby Collieries Co. v. Yorkshire Miners Assn., (1906)
A.C. 239.
(1899) L.R., 23 Q.B.D. 598.
62 Ky. 143, 1 Duv. 143 (1863).
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The importance of this opinion in Kentucky labor law can-
not be overstressed. It held that combinations of laborers to
raise wages were proper. It added that the agreements that they
make, however, will be enforced only if they are reasonable, con-
sidering the interest of the public at large.
The next case to be considered in this subdivision is Huston
v. Rentlinger,25 decided in 1891. Here the doctrine was applied
to an agreement between a group of employers, as contrasted
with the situation in the Sayre case. A by-law of a board of
insurance underwriters, a voluntary association formed for the
purpose of securing uniformity in rates of premiums, prohibited
any member from employing any solicitor who had severed his
connection with another member of the board. The appellee
in this case had been denied privileges of the association because
he had broken this by-law. He asks to be reinstated. The court
granted his request, ruling that the above by-law was in restraint
of trade, and, therefore, unenforceable.
By this decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals made it
clear that contracts, whether of employers or employees, in
restraint of trade were unenforceable.
Before passing on, however, attention must be called to
certain language found in this case. The court said:
1. . . The laborer has a right to fix his own price for his labor,
and the employer the sum he is willing to pay, and combinations entered
into for the purpose of preventing the exercise of those rights are
unlawful.. "
If carried to its logical conclusion, this statement would have
spelled trouble for organized labor in this state. The possibility
here suggested that such combination of laborers, or employers,
constituted a criminal conspiracy was eliminated, as above
shown, by the decision in the Aetna Insurance Company case.
But the unenforceability of agreements by such combinations
for such purposes as being in restraint of trade was distinctly
reiterated in the Aetna case,20 in the following dictum:
. . . We must not be mistaken as intimating that contracts In
restraint of trade, or which prevent a contracting party from accepting
employment from or giving it to whomsoever he may desire, are not
illegal, in the sense of being void, as against public policy. That such
contracts are unenforceable is settled law in this state. . . .
- 91 Ky. 333, 15 S.W. 867 (1891).
- Aetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624
(1899).
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Does the Huston case overrule the Sayre case? If a member
of a labor union went to work for a lower wage than the union
had set, and the union brought suit against this laborer for
damages resulting from this act, would the court hold that the
contract with respect to the wages of laborers was in restraint
of trade under the above language of the Huston case and there-
fore unenforceable, or would the court say that whether or not
the contract is in restraint of trade depends upon whether or
not the wage scale set by the union, of which this party was a
member, was reasonable, from the viewpoint of the public, as
well as of the parties? No mention of the Sayre case appears
in the Huston case. It is to be hoped, that, if the above proposi-
tion ever does come before the Court of Appeals, it will apply
the rule of the Sayre case.27
Tnm TOT Or CIVIL CONSPMACY
The tort of civil conspiracy in so far as it applies to
employer-employee controversies never flowered in the Common-
wealth of Kentucky. The reason for this lies in a series of
cases decided in this state during the years when England was
working out the application of the doctrine to combinations of
labor there. In these Kentucky cases, employees were attempt-
ing to apply the doctrine to combinations of employers. The
first of this series was Hundley v. Louisville & Nashville Ry.
o.28 This was a suit by an employee against the railroad to
2 There have been several cases in the Kentucky Court of Appeals
Involving the doctrine of restraint of trade as applied to contracts
between employers and individual employees. In the typical case, A,
an employee, contracts with B, the employer, that he will not engage
in the same business, in the same territory, for a certain period after
termination of the contract by either party. The contract is termi-
nated, and A sets up in the same business, within the time and/or area
prohibited, in violation of the contract. Suit by B to enjoin A follows.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has said, with respect to such agree-
ments: "Covenants of this character, though recognized to be in par-
tial restraint of trade, are sustained where properly limited as to time
and territory and are not otherwise against public policy, the test
generally being whether the restraint is necessary for the protection of
the business or good will of the employer, and, if so, whether it imposes
on the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary
to secure the business of the employer, or the good will thereof
." Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. hMason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295
(1926). Accord: Eigelbach v. Boone Loan & Investment Co., 216 Ky.
69, 287 S.W. 225 (1926); and Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 233
Ky. 115, 25 S.W. (2d) 62 (1920).
105 Ky. 162, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1085, 48 S.W. 429 (1898).
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recover damages for wrongful acts of the defendant whereby
plaintiff had been prevented from obtaining employment. The
defendant railroad, along with others, had an agreement whereby
none of them would hire any employee discharged for cause by
any one of them. Plaintiff alleged that this was a conspiracy,
and that he had been injured by it, because of defendant's false
entry of discbarge for cause. In discussing whether or not
plaintiff had stated a cause of action the court said:
. .. It was one of the purposes of the common law to protect
every person against the wrongful acts of every other person, and
it did not matter whether they were committed by one person or by a
combination of persons, and under it an action was maintainable for
the injuries done by disturbing a person in the enjoyment of any right
or privilege which he had." (Italics added.)
And again, a little farther along in the opinion, the court said:
"Injury is the gist of the action. The liability is damage for doing,
not for conspiracy. The charge of conspiracy does not change the
nature of the act. .....
The court, thus, denied the possibility of tort arising out of
mere conspiracy. 29 As was indicated in the opinion, it felt that
the cause of action, if any, was simply:
"Thus, if one is prevented, by the wrongful act of a third party,
from securing some employment he has sought, he suffers a legal wrong,
provided he can show that the failure to employ him was the direct and
natural consequences of the wrongful act."
In spite of this decision, the idea evidently still persisted
that the presence of a conspiracy would make wrong that which,
if done by one person, might be right. Such a contention was
made, in effect, in Baker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance (o. 3 '
Plaintiff had been discharged by the defendant pursuant to an
alleged conspiracy based on an agreement between defendant
2 It should be noted that there was no feeling on the part of this
court similar to that found in Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) A.C. 495, where
the court said: ". . . Does a conspiracy to injure, resulting in
damage, give rise to civil liability? It seems to me that there is author-
ity for that proposition, and that it is founded in good sense.
That a conspiracy to injure-an oppressive combination-differs widely
from an invasion of civil rights by a single individual cannot be
doubted. . .. A man may resist without much difficulty the wrong-
ful act of an individual . .. but it is a very different thing
when one man has to defend himself against many combined to do him
wrong."
mQuotation from Chambers v. Probst, 145 Ky. 381, 140 S.W. 572
(1911).
3a 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1174, 64 S.W. 913 (1901).
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and other insurance companies not to hire each other's former
employees within a two-year period after severance of relations.
Plaintiff had been employed by another insurance company
within two years of taking a position with defendant. When
defendant learned this, plaintiff was discharged. In this action
plaintiff insisted that the gist of his action was not breach of
contract, but the conspiracy which resulted in his discharge.
The court dismissed the action on the ground that:
"It Is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty
to refuse business relations with any person whatsoever, whether the
refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice,
or malice."
The court did suggest that a civil action would lie if actual
legal damages resulted from some overt act done in pursuance of
a conspiracy. But, the language of the opinion left little doubt
that it was not the conspiracy that gave rise to the cause of
action, but a wrongful act interfering with plaintiff's right.
The same party brought another action at the same time on
the same facts against the Sun Life Insurance Company of
America, 32 by whom he had been formerly employed. His
theory, in this case, was damages for procuring his discharge
from the employment of another.33 In dismissing the case the
court said, by way of dietum, that, to recover, plaintiff must
show a conspiracy to do an unlawful act by reason of which
a civil right of plaintiff was infringed.
At the same term of court, one Trimble, a former employee
of the Prudential Insurance Company, sued it, to recover dam-
ages for alleged conspiracy to prevent him from receiving
employment. He alleged that he had sought employment from
another insurance company and been turned down because of
the agreement among the insurance companies, above men-
tioned. It should be noted that in this case, Trimble v. The
Prudential IRsurance Co. of America,34 Trimble, so far as
pleadings go, satisfied the dicta of both the Hundley and the
Sun Life cases. Yet the court dismissed the complaint. Why?
Said the court:
(The insurance companies) "had the right to employ, or not to
"Baker v. Sun Life Insurance Company of America, 23 Ky. L. Rep.
1178, 64 S.W. 967 (1901)
'With respect to this theory, see the next subdivision of this
article.
1,23 Ky. L. Rep. 1184, 64 S.W. 915 (1901).
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employ any applicant as they pleased. The alleged agreement that
neither of them would employ one who had been discharged by either
of the other two was contrary to public policy, and not obligatory. The
refusal of the two companies to employ appellant was, therefore, their
voluntary act. It violated no legal right of his.
Here a man was prevented from receiving employment by what
the court itself designated a wrongful act, and yet, no liability
followed, said the court, on the theory of the decision in Bakcer
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.35 It is submitted that
this decision, regardless of its obvious partiality for defendants
and its amazing logic, did deny the possibility of tort liability
arising from conspiracy, as such.
The only Kentucky case in which the contention was made
that a combination of laborers, acting pursuant to a common
design, should be held liable for damages on a theory of con-
spiracy, is Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union.30 This
was a suit by an employer to force the defendant union to fur-
nish him with union labor, or at least, to allow him to use the
union seal. Speaking of the pleadings and proof, the court
said:
"There is an intimation in the pleading, if not a positive charge,
that the failure of appellees to contract with appellant was the result
of a conspiracy entered into between the walking delegates . . .
and appellant's competitors, for the purpose of destroying his business.
We find no substantial evidence in the record to justify or support this
charge. But even if it were true, it would be of no avail; for since
appellees had the right to cease laboring for appellant, it is immaterial
what moved them to exercise this right. "
As a result, it can be definitely said that the tort of civil con-
spiracy, so dangerous to organized labor in its early years in
England, found no sympathy in Kentucky's highest court.
INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT
The possibility of a successful action for damages for induc-
ing a breach of contract was eliminated in Kentucky by the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Chambers & Marshall v.
Baldwin.3 7 This case established the rule that a party to a
contract cannot maintain an action against a person who,
regardless of motive, advises and procures the other party to
break it.3s
Supra, note 31.
147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
91 Ky. 121, 153 S.W. 57 (1891).
' Referring to this decision, the Court of Appeals in Boulier v.
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No attempt has ever been made, so far as cases in the Court
of Appeals are concerned, to hold a labor organization liable for
damages for inducing breach of contract. The theory of the
English authorities above mentioned,3 9 could not be successfully
argued in this state. It is based on the idea that one is liable for
inducing a breach of contract unless he can show sufficient justi-
fication. Whereas, it should be noted, Kentucky maintains that
one is not liable for inducing breach of contract, regardless of
his motive, unless the act is clearly shown to be the proximate
cause of the damage sustained.4 0 Also, the English theory
turned on the belief that ordinary union objectives were not
sufficient justification. It is submitted that Kentucky author-
ities take a different view on this also. For example, the Court
of Appeals in Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union,
4 1
approved this statement:
"The courts have invariably upheld the right of individuals to form
Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S.W. 60 (1891), wrote: ". . . It is, how-
ever, contended for appellant that the principle upon which the leading
English case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 228 (sic), was decided, is
correct, and applicable to this . . . The theory upon which Lumley
v. Gye seems to have been decided is that remedies given by the com-
mon law in such cases as that are not limited to any description of
servants or service, and the action was maintained upon the principle
stated in Comyn's Digest, that 'in all cases where a man has a temporal
loss or damage by the wrong of another he may have an action upon
the case to be repaired in damages'. . . . But it was held in Cham-
bers v. Baldwin that, to maintain an action upon the case at common
law, the act upon which it is founded must not only amount to a
legal wrong, but be the approximate cause of the loss or damage
sustained, and that upon the principle, and according to the decided
weight of authority in the United States, whether a legal wrong has
been done or not depends upon the nature and quality of the act, not
upon the motive of the person doing it; the following clear and forcible
statement of the proposition in Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. St. 308, being
quoted and approved: 'Ialicious motives make a bad case worse, but
they cannot make that wrong which, in its own essence is lawful."'
The Court of Appeals felt that the proximate cause of the loss or dam-
age was the refusal of the contracting party to go through with his
promise, rather than the act of the third person who induced the con-
tracting party so to act.
In line with this interpretation see the language of the Court of
Appeals in Baker v. Sun Life Insurance Company of America, 23 Ky.
L. Rep. 1178, 64 S.W. 967 (1901), that: "A party to a contract cannot
maintain an action against a person who has maliciously advised and
procured the other party to break it, unless the person procuring the
breaking of the contract did so by coercion or deception, and thus
caused the party to break the contract against his will, or contrary to
his purpose."
m See, supra, footnote 22.
"See, supra, footnote 38.
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labor organizations for the protection of the interest of the laboring
classes, and have denied the power to enjoin the members of such
associations from withdrawing peaceably from any service, either singly
or in a body, even where such withdrawal involves a breach of
contract.""2
INTERERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Attention must, however, be called to Chambers v. Probst.43
This was an action to recover damages sustained by reason of
plaintiff's discharge as a railroad crossing watchman as a result
of the allegedly unwarranted, unlawful and malicious inter-
meddling of the defendant. At first glance one might get the
impression that this case allowed a recovery against a third party
for inducing breach of contract. Such ii not the case. There
was no breach of contract, because plaintiff's contract was
terminable at will. The basis for the juagment for the plaintiff
in this case was, in the language of the court, that:
"We are of the opinion that it is an actionable wrong to unlawfully
interfere with one's right to labor, and that it is unlawful to make to an
employer false and malicious statements concerning the manner in
which the employee discharges his duty."
This opinion is, therefore, direct authority for the view that
liability does follow from unlawful interference with contractual
relations resulting in loss or damage.43 A
It stands alone, however, in this field. No attempt has ever
been made to hold a labor organization liable on this theory, in
Kentucky. The reasons are, in all probability, two: first, the
decision in the Baldwin case, for reasons above set out; and
" 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
"See also, a similar dictum in fDiamond Block Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers of America, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
"145 Ky. 381, 140 S.W. 572 (.1911).
3A It is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this article to examine
in detail the possible effect of the decision in the Probst case on the
general rule announced In the Badwin. case. It is submitted that
although the cases may be reconciled they are in conflict in theory.
In passing, it would seem that the Baldwin case refused to find the
third person liable because the plaintiff had a cause of action against
the contracting party for breach of contract. Whereas, in the Probst
case, since there was no breach of contract, the court was compelled
to hold the third person liable, or leave the plaintiff without a remedy
against anyone. Yet, it should be noted, the same sort of intervening
act by an independent person-the refusal of a party under contract
to go on with contract, regardless of whether it means a breach of said
contract or not-is found in both cases. Query-Why was this the
proximate cause of loss in one case and not in the other?
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second, certain language in the Probst case with respect to what
the court meant by "unlawful" interference. Said the court:
"It is universally agreed that any interference with the right to
labor which is the result of competition is justifiable."
ENTICING LABOR TO ABANDON CONTRACT
In 1867, the following statute became law in Kentucky :44
"If any person shall wilfully entice, persuade, or otherwise influ-
ence any person or persons who have contracted to labor for a fixed
period of time, to abandon such contract before such period of service
shall have expired, without the consent of the employer, shall be fined
not exceeding fifty dollars, and be liable to the party injured for such
damages as he or they may have sustained.""5
This statute is still a part of the Criminal Law of Kentucky.4 6
No prosecutions under this Act, if there have been any, have
ever reached the Court of Appeals. Why have labor's opponents
failed to make use of this apparently available device? The
answer lies tucked away in Bonlier v. Macauley,47 decided in
1891. This was an action for damages claimed to have resulted
from the defendant's action in inducing one Mary Anderson, a
well-known dramatic performer, to breach her contract with the
plaintiff, and to perform for the defendant. In view of the
decision in Owambers v. Baldwin,48 that a party to a contract
cannot maintain an action against one who, even with malice
and design to injure, and to benefit himself, advises and pro-
cures the other party to the contract to breach it, the plaintiff
in the Boulier case attempted to found a cause of action on the
theory that the defendant's action, under the facts of the case,
was a violation of the statute above set forth, and therefore
compensable.40 The court answered this contention as follows:
"We are satisfied that the statute, passed soon after slavery ceased
""Acts 1867", c. 2042, p. 103; Bullock & Johnson, "General Stat-
utes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky" (1873) p. 341.
"According to Landis, in the Historical Introduction to his "Cases
on Labor Law" (1934), in 1349, the Ordinance of Laborers imposed
liability, both civil and criminal, upon a master who enticed a servant
away from another. When Elizabeth codified all prior labor legislation
In the Statute of Elizabeth in 1562, no special provision was included
dealing with enticement of servants. However, Landis points out,
citing authority, that the action for enticement survived this neglect,
and was recognized in the courts thereafter.
" Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1936) Sec. 1349.
4' 91 Ky. 135, 15 S.W. 60 (1891).
" 91 Ky. 121, 15 S.W. 57 (1891).
Note that this statute expressly creates a civil cause of action in
favor of the party injured by the acts declared unlawful.
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to exist in this state, and consequent change of the labor system took
place, was intended to apply principally to farm laborers, and to extend
application of it so as to include contracts for performance of dramatic
artists would be not only fraught with much injustice, unnecessary
strife, and litigation, but is entirely beyond the intended scope and
operation of it."
Thus limited, this statute no longer carries tlhe threat to organ-
ized labor apparent on its face.50
"ENDs" FOR WHICH LABoR MAY ORGANIZM
On numerous occasions the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
has suggested the "ends" for which labor may legally organize.
Thus, the court has stated that labor might organize, "to promote
their mutual advantage" ;51 to secure fair wages; 52 to maintain
high standards of workmanship ;53 to elevate the material, moral
and intellectual welfare of the membership;54 to secure the
abolition of child labor, the 'trucking' system, tenement house
labor and prison labor; 55 to secure better hours; 56 to secure
61A survey of the case and statute law in Kentucky reveals that
this interpretation of the Statute still stands. Attention is directed,
however, to Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Pack, 192 Ky. 74, 232 S.W.
36 (1921), in which the problem was indirectly involved. The case
arose out of a civil charge of false imprisonment. The defense asserted
that the plaintiff had been detained, not by it, but by known officers,
charged with the crime of enticing laborers (miners) to abandon their
contracts. The court saw fit to dismiss the case on the ground that
the defense offered was sufficient to show an adequate reason for the
defendant's refusal to resist the officers in arresting a passenger.
Unfortunately, from our view-point, the court ruled that it was no
concern of the railroad whether the arrest was or was not valid, under
such circumstances as these.
5 1 Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Assn., 62 Ky. 143 (1863).
'"Hetterman v. Powers, 102 Ky. 133, 43 S.W. 180 (1897); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624 (1899); Saulsberry
v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912);
Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188 Ky.
477, 222 S.W. 1077 (1820); Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co.,
198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923); Alsbrook v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky.
814, 50 S. W. (2d) 22 (1932); Hotel, Restaurant and Sodai Fountain
Employees Local Union No. 181, v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W.
(2d) 501 (1938).
Hetterman v. Powers, 102 Ky. 133, 43 S.W. 180 (1897).5 Hetterman v. Powers, 102 Ky. 133, 43 S.W. 180 (1897); Diamond
Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188 Ky. 477, 222
S.W. 1079 (1820); Alsbrook v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 814, 50 S.W.
(2d) 22 (1932).
Hetterman v. Powers, 102 Ky. 133, 43 S.W. 180 (1897).T Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W.
1018 (1912); Hotel, Restaurant and Soda Fountain Employees Local
Union No. 181 v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W. (2d) 501 (1938).
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better working conditions; 57 to induce employers to establish
usages in respect to wages and working conditions which are
fair, reasonable, and humane; 58 and recently, to achieve "the
fundamental right to contract collectively with the employer." 59
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals held that if the
purpose of a union was to establish a closed shop, that purpose
is unlawful. 60 This is the only "end" which has been declared
illegal in this state to date. But, it emphasizes the importance
of the legality of the "end", for the means which organized
labor may employ are limited to cases in which the end desired
is, in the opinion of the court, legitimate.
TEE MEANS AvAmABIMi TO ORGANizED LABo
In order to accomplish an "end" recognized by the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals as proper, the Court has stated that a
labor organization may use the strike ;61 it may indulge in peace-
ful picketing;02 it may use any peaceable means, not partaking
of fraud, to induce others to become members; 63 it may acquaint
the public with facts which it regards as unfair, give notoriety
to its cause, and use persuasive inducements to bring its own
policies to triumph, and picketing or publicity for such pur-
poses is not per se unlawful ;64 when engaged in a lawful strike,
its members may join a crowd to persuade other men who pro-
pose to work not to take their places ;66 its members have a law-
S Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W.
1018 (1912); Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920); Piercy v. Louisville &
Nashville Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923); Alsbrook v. Com-
monwealth, 243 Ky. 814, 50 S.W. (2d) 22 (1932); Hotel, Restaurant and
Soda Fountain Employees Local Union No. 181 v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466,
114 S.W. (2d) 501 (1938).
"' Hudson v. C.,N.O. & T.P. Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913).
"Hotel, Restaurant and Soda Fountain Employees Local Union
No. 181 v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W. (2d) 501 (1938).
' Hotel, Restaurant and Soda Fountain Employees Local Union
No. 181 v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W. (2d) 501 (1938).
Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W.
1018 (1912); Alsbrook v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 814, 50 S.W. (2d) 22
(1932); Newton v. Commonwealth, 244 Ky. 41, 50 S.W. (2d) 18 (1932).
"Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Machine Operator's Local
No. 165, 249 Ky. 639, 61 S.W. (2d) 283 (1933).
"Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188
Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
, Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Machine Operator's Local
No. 165, 249 Ky. 639, 61 S.W. (2d) 283 (1933).0 Newton v. Commonwealth, %A4 Ky. 41, 10 S.W. (2d) 18 (1932);
Commonwealth v. Compton, 259 Ky. 565, 82 S.W. (2d) 813 (1935).
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ful right to assemble, to address their fellowmen, and to
endeavor in a peaceful, reasonable and proper manner to per-
suade them regarding the merits of their cause, and to enlist
sympathy, support and succor in the struggle for legitimate
labor "ends" ;66 and, finally, members of a labor union may
assemble and agree to pursue, and pursue, any legal means to
gain their ends, that is, use persuasive powers in a peaceable
way.6
7
LIMITATIONS ON THE M-EANS
In the use of persuasion, assembly, the strike, picketing,
and the like, organized labor has not been allowed a free hand.
Certain definite limitations have been imposed. Thus, for
example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has ruled that labor
organizations may use only "lawful means" in their struggle
to gain legitimate "ends";68 that when the purpose of the
combination is to raise wages, their right is limited to obtaining
"reasonable prices" for their labor; 69 that the laborers so com-
bining to get higher wages must be bound by no contract;70
that laborers so combining must not resort to intimidation and
violence, whereby property is destroyed, or its safety imper-
iled;71 that they must use peaceable means, not partaking of
fraud;72 that the acts permitted must not be carried to the
extent of violating the criminal law ;73 that ". . . force, violence,
'" Alsbrook v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 814, 50 S.W. (2d) 22 (1932);
Commonwealth v. Compton, 259 Ky. 565, 82 S.W. (2d) 813 (1935).
11 Commonwealth v. Compton, 259 Ky. 565, 82 S.W. (2d) 813 (1935).
0 Aetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624
(1899); Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,
188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
6 Aetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624
(1899).
" See, Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Association, 62 Ky.
143, 1 Duv. 143 (1863); and see, Aetna Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth,
106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624 (1899). But see, Saulsberry v. Coopers' Inter-
national Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912); Diamond Block Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079
(1920).
7 Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640, 78 S.W. 482 (1904); Sauls.
berry v. Coopers' International Union, ,147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018
(1912); Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,
188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
"Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188
Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
"Cobb v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 424, 46 S.W. (2d) 776 (1932);
Alsbrook v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 814, 50 S.W. (2d) 22 (1932); New-
ton v. Commonwealth, 244 Ky. 41, 60 S.W. (2d) 18 (1932); Common-
wealth v. Compton, 259 Ky. 566, 82 S.W. (2d) 813 (1935).
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or threats thereof, terror, menace, intimidation, coercion, deliber-
ate misrepresentation, spreading of falsehoods, and the like, can
never be tolerated";74 and, finally, that picketing will not be
permitted, regardless of how peaceable, if it becomes a
nuisance. 7 5
Tnn UsE OF TE INJUNCTION IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
The conclusions listed in the three immediately preceding
subdivisions were garnered from eases arising on many and
varied legal theories. However, most of them resulted from the
court's decisions in cases wherein the petitioner had requested
injunctive relief. The importance of the injunction in industrial
strife cannot be overestimated. It has proved to be the thorn in
the side of organized labor.76
It is, therefore, interesting to discover that the earliest case
in the Kentucky Court of Appeals involving the use of the
injunction in industrial disputes was one in which, organized
labor used this weapon successfully against a former employer
of union labor. The case was Hetterman, v. Powers,77 decided in
1897. The case involved the right of a union to protect its
property, a point which will be considered in detail later on in
this article.
The next case involving the use of the injunction in an
industrial dispute was U'nderhill v. Murpty,7 8 decided in 1904.
Suit was brought by a former employer against former
employees, all of whom were members of a union, to enjoin the
commission of acts of violence and intimidation. The proof
showed that defendants picketed plaintiff's place of business,
beat up one of plaintiff's employees, threatened others with
74Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Machine Operator's Local
No. 165, 249 Ky. 639, 61 S.W. (2d) 283 (1933).
75Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Machine Operator's Local
No. 165, 249 Ky. 639, 61 S.W. (2d) 283 (1933).
"For a historical survey of the use of the injunction in labor dis-
putes, see Landis, Historical Introduction to "Cases on Labor Law"
(1934), at p. 36-37; Nelles, "A Strike and its Legal Consequences",
40 Yale L.J. 507 (1931); Frankfurter and Greene, "The Labor Injunc-
tion", (1930); Witte, "Early American Labor Cases", 35 Yale- L. J.
825 (1926); Bonnett, "The Origin of the Labor Injunction" 5 So. Cal.
L.R. 105 (1931). In Landis' Historical Introduction, the author says
that the earliest precedent for the use of the injunction in labor con-
troversy occurred in England in 1868, and the first case in this country
so using the injunction was decided in 1877.
77102 Ky. 133, 43 S.W. 180 (1897).
8 117 Ky. 640, 78 S.W. 482 (1904).
K. I. J.-6
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similar treatment, and prevented them from going to or working
on jobs away from the plaintiff's place of business. The proof
also showed that plaintiff had at one time been under contract
with the union to hire union help at certain wages, that when this
contract expired it had not been renewed because of inability of
the plaintiff and the union to agree as to wages. In sustaining
the issuance of the injunction below, the court said, speaking of
the rights of organized labor on the one hand, and owners of a
business on the other:
"The constitutional right of free speech may not be infringed.
Peaceful persuasion or lawful appeals to reason or sentiment may not
be interfered with. But when intimidation and violence are resorted
to, and thereby property is destroyed, or its safety imperiled, the
chancellor may properly, by injunction, protect the owner of the
property in the enjoyment of his constitutional right that his property
shall not be taken from him."'
It is submitted that no fair-minded person could say that,
consistent with law and order, this decision was unfair to
organized labor. On the contrary, in the face of over-activity,
the court recognized the right of organized labor to achieve its
"ends" through peaceful means.
Eight years later, in Saulsberry v. (oopeir's International
Union,80 this fact situation came before the Court of Appeals.
The defendant laboi union had been under contract with the
plaintiff whereby it furnished him labor at a stipulated price of
35 cents per hour for a day's work of nine hours. Goods pro-
duced by this union labor were stamped with the stamp of the
union as proof of this. 'When this contract expired, the union
offered a new contract with an eight-hour day at 40 cents per
hour. Plaintiff refused to sign. Whereupon, the union leaders
took possession of its stamp and notified the employees that they
were "out of a job". Plaintiff brought this suit demanding that
the union be forced to bargain with him, at his terms, or, at least,
Attention is directed to the fact that this case is authority for the
rule in Kentucky that equity will not decline to take jurisdiction of a
case on the ground that the act complained of is a crime. Said the
court: "The enforcement of the criminal law is for the criminal court,
but where the breach of the criminal law is also a violation of a
property right the chancellor may interpose by injunction to protect
property."
81147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
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that the union be forced to let him use its stamp.8 1 Said the
court:
"The simple question presented by this record is, Can a labor
organization be required to enter into a contract with one desiring the
services of its men upon terms not acceptable to it? The lower court
held that it could not. In that conclusion we concur."
In the body of the opinion the court recognized the right
of organized labor to cease furnishing union labor, the right to
strike for better wages, and the right of the union to control its
property. This decision represents yet another victory for
organized labor.
Another eight years passed before the next injunction case
arising out of a labor controversy reached the Court of Appeals.
In 1920, in Dianzond Block CoaZ Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America,8 2 this fact situation was before the court. Suit was
brought by the plaintiff, a coal mining company, to enjoin the
defendant labor union from erecting houses near plaintiff's coal
mine, and from inducing or persuading any of the plaintiff's
employees to break their contracts of employment with the plain-
tiff. The facts brought out at the trial showed that the defendant
union had never been able to make a labor agreement with the
plaintiff company. In fact, the facts showed that plaintiff com-
pany fired any employee who became affiliated with a labor
union, and for that alone. A temporary restraining order had
been granted below on th.e basis of the complaint filed, and was
sustained on the hearing of a motion by defendant to dissolve the
same. The Court of Appeals concluded that the injunction had
been improperly issued, and ordered it dissolved at once. The
importance of this case warrants extensive quotation from the
opinion. Said the court:
"As there is no evidence to support the allegations of the petition
that defandants have used threats, intimidation, coercion, and fraud to
accomplish their purposes, and as these allegations are specifically
denied by defendants, thus putting the burden of proof upon the plain-
tiff, and as it is admitted by plaintiff and its officers that its mines
continue uninterruptedly to run, and no employe has been induced by
defendants, or either of them, to leave its employment at any time, it
follows that the plaintiff has wholly failed to make out its case unless
' Your attention is directed to the fact that in these two cases
last discussed, we find factual evidence of dealings between employers
and unions before 1904 of an obviously friendly nature. Trouble arose
In both cases not out of attempts to unionize, but simply because the
employer and the union could not agree on renewal terms.
188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
KENTUcKY LAw JOURNAL
it be that the peaceable solicitation of miners to become members of
the organization in that district was a violation of the rights of the
plaintiff, . . . In its last analysis, plaintiff's only complaint sup-
ported by evidence is that defendants . . . are soliciting other
employes to become members of the union.
"The general rule seems to be that organizers of labor unions
may use any peaceable means, not partaking of fraud, to induce per-
sons to become members, and equity will not enjoin such organizers,
or their associates, from attempting by proper argument to persuade
others to join the union so long as they do not resort to force or intimi-
dation. If the union should induce employes of the plaintiff to become
members of its organization, and the plaintiff, as it has done In the
past, should discharge such employes because of their membership in
the union, and the plaintiff should thereby lose the service of the
employe, the proximate cause would not be the joining of the union
by the employe, but the discharge of the employe by the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff could have no legal redress of the defendant, even though
all its employes should so join the union and should in conse-
quence suffer discharge by the plaintiff, and its business should be
closed.
"In this jurisdiction the rule is thoroughly established that a labor
organization, through its officers and agents, may organize new
branches and solicit membership among employes of concerns that are
opposed to union labor so long as they use only peaceable means, such
as persuasion and argument, and are not guilty of threats against the
person or property, intimidation, coercion, or fraud. . .
It is obvious that the decision in the Court of Appeals was
markedly favorable to organized labor. But, this case, on its
facts, brings to light a deplorable misuse of an extraordinary
remedy created, not to hamper, but to obtain justice. On the
basis of a petition containing allegations which the pleader was,
as it subsequently appeared, absolutely unable to prove, an
injunction was issued restraining another party from doing
what, as it subsequently appeared, it had a legal right to do.
The misuse of the injunction in this way in labor disputes has
led other jurisdictions, notably the federal government, to take
steps to put a stop to it. It is no argument to say, but on
appeal, the injunction will be dissolved if improperly granted.
That is too late in many eases, in view of the nature of the
controversy, the economic and social conditions and positions of
the parties. Since the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has con-
demned such practice by dissolving injunctions improperly
issued, why should the lawyer, or the layman, object to a law
which limits the issuance of an injunction in industrial con-
troversy to a point after there has been a full hearing on the
merits? When a rule of procedure, or a remedy available in
the courts, is perverted by those interested solely in their own
selfish ends so as to make of the law a tool of injustice, that rule
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of procedure or that remedy must be corrected, or limited, until,
once again, it is a means of obtaining justice, and that alone.
It is to be hoped that the Kentucky bar will stand behind the
people of Kentucky, in fact, urge them to correct this existing
defect in the administration of justice in this Commonwealth.8 3
Mention might be made, in passing, of the fact brought out
in this case that it was the practice of the plaintiff company to
"fire" any employee who joined a labor union. There appear
to be no cases in the Kentucky Court of Appeals passing directly
on the validity of the so-called "Yellow-Dog" contract,-that is,
an agreement by an employee that he will refrain from joining
a labor organization. Such contracts have been held valid. Thus
in Hitchman, Coal and Coke Export Co. v. Mitchell,s4 the
Supreme Court issued an injunction to restrain a labor union
from inducing workmen who had signed such contracts to break
them by joining the union. In Adair v. United States,8 5 federal
legislation declaring such a contract illegal was held unconsti-
tutional. In Coppage v. Kansas,s 6 a similar state enactment was
held unconstitutional. However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act,8 7
by rendering such contracts unenforceable in the federal courts,
has rendered nugatory this line of authority, in so far as it
applies to federal cases. Many states have reached the same
result by similar legislation.
It is submitted that there is no imperative need in Ken-
tucky for legislation with respect to yellow-dog contracts. In a
strong dictum in the Diamond Block case, the Court of Appeals
said:
"The courts . . . have denied the power to enjoin members of
such associations from withstanding peaceably from any service, either
0 For fuller information on the nature of anti-injunction legislation,
its purpose, its constitutionality, and the like, see the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 U. S. Stat. 70, c. 90, 29 U.S.C.A. Sees.
101-115; see Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C.C.A.
2dC.) (1934); cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934); Frankfurter and
Greene, "Congressional Power over the Labor Injunction", 31 Col. L.R.
385 (1931); Christ, "The Federal Anti-Injunction Bill", 26 Ill. L.R. 516
(1932); Witte, "The Federal Anti-Injunction Act", 16 Minn. L.R. 638
(1932); Fraenkel, "Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and
Yellow-Dog Contracts", 30 Ill. L.R. 854 (1936); Riddlesbarger, "State
Anti-Injunction Legislation", 14 Ore. L.R. 501 (1935).
" 245 U.S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917).
208 U.S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908).
236 U.S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915).
"47 U.S. Stat. '70, c. 90; 29 U.S.C.A. Sees. 101-115.
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singly, or in a body, even where such withdrawal involves a breach of
contract."3'
In 1933, the Court of Appeals decided Music Hall Theatre
v. Moving Picture Machine Operators' Local No. 165.89 Injunc-
tive relief was requested by the plaintiff theatre against the
defendant union, whose members had been formerly employed
by the plaintiff. Plaintiff and defendant had been unable to
agree on wages when the contract expired. Plaintiff, thereupon,
hired a non-union operator. The defendant established a picket
aine at plaintiff's theatre, consisting of three or four men who
patrolled the sidewalk at and near the entrance to the theatre,
one of whom carried a banner with the inscription, "This
theatre does not employ union operator, member of Local No.
165 . . . affiliated with the American Federation of Labor".
The facts show that these pickets also accosted prospective
patrons, told them the building was a fire trap, or that no show
Was going on at the time, or that the theatre was not open, or
that the non-union operators didn't know their business, as a
result of which there was likely to be a fire. They also dis-
tributed handbills calling attention to the use of non-union op-
erators. Plaintiff's business fell off over 50%. A temporary
injunction was issued in the court below, restraining all such
activities. On appeal the Court of Appeals held, in the language
of a later case,
the circuit court had improperly issued an injunction
against the peaceful picketing by carrying the banner, but had properly
enjoined the making of false statements, the indulgence of violence,
and interference with the business.""
This decision recognized the validity of picketing as a legitimate
weapon of organized labor in industrial disputes. It should be
noted that the purpose of the picketing in this case was not to
induce other workers to join the union or not to take the jobs of
men on strike, but to force the plaintiff to deal with the defend-
ant union by inducing or persuading third persons to withdraw
their patronage. In so far as this court recognized the right of
the defendant union to induce or persuade such third persons
by peaceful means, such as peaceful picketing and truthful plac-
8See also a similar dictum in Saulsberry v. Coopers' International
Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
"249 Ky. 639, 61 S.W. (2d) 283 (1933).
,0 Hotel, Restaurant and Soda Pountain Employees' Local Union
No. 181 v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W. (2d) 501 (1938).
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ards to withdraw their patronage, this case is authority for the
validity of the use of the primary boycott in industrial disputes.91
However, in so far as this court declared illegal the action of the
defendant union in attempting to persuade prospective custom-
ers of the plaintiff to withdraw their trade by means of coercive
pressure applied to the actual or prospective customer, such as
to put such customer in fear of personal loss or damage, this
case is authority for the general rule that secondary boycotts
are illegal weapons in industrial disputes.
92
The most recent case to reach the Court of Appeals, involv-
ing the use of the injunction in industrial disputes, is Hotel,
Restaurant, and Soda Fountain Employees' Local Union No. 181
v. Miller,03 decided in 1938. Plaintiff Miller, a restaurant
owner, sued in equity to restrain the defendant labor union from
picketing his restaurant and interfering with his business. The
purpose of the picketing, as shown from the facts, was to force
plaintiff to employ members of the defendant union.94 Miller
stated that he permitted defendant to solicit his employees to
join the union, and that they refused, and, thereafter, these
" The boycott, one of labor's most potent weapons, is not easy to
define. It covers a wide range and variety of activities, ranging from
a mere withdrawal of business by an individual to an organized effort
by a group of individuals to procure all others to withdraw their busi-
ness, by means ranging from simple persuasion to disturbance of busi-
ness relations with third persons by force, or threats, or intimidation.
Boycotts are classified as primary and secondary. A primary boycott
has been defined as a combination to refrain from dealing with a cer-
tain party, or a combination to advise or by peaceful means to per-
suade that party's customers to refrain from dealing with him. See
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
"A secondary boycott differs from the primary in that it is a
combination to exercise coercive pressure upon customers, actual or
prospective, of the party, in order to cause them to withhold or with-
draw patronage from such party through fear of loss or damage to
themselves should they deal with him. See Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
"1272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W. (2d) 501 (1938).
"Attention is called to this fact in order to distinguish this case
from one in which the primary effort of the union is to induce
employees to join the union, and where the methods used are not such
as to constitute a secondary boycott. (See footnote 92 supra). This
distinction would seem important because of the language in Diamond
Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W.
1074 (1920), that, "In this jurisdiction the rule is thoroughly established
that a labor organization, through its officers and agents, may organize
new branches and solicit membership among employees of concerns
that are opposed to union labor, so long as they use only peaceable
means, such as persuasion and argument, and are not guilty of threats
against the person or property, intimidation, coercion, or fraud."
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employees formed their own union. These employees, acting as
as a group, then made a contract with Miller. Miller thereupon
told defendant labor union that he was no longer in a position
to deal with them. Whereupon the defendant labor union began
picketing the restaurant, carrying a placard bearing the words,
"This Restaurant is unfair to organized labor-Hotel, Restau-
rant and Soda Fountain Employees' Local Union No. 181, affil-
iated with the American Federation of Labor".
The court dismissed, as unimportant, the fact that Miller
discharged his only employee who belonged to the defendant
union, on the ground that "a tender of re-employment was made,
but the cook refused to return. Deeming her action as volun-
tarily quitting work, the incident of her discharge may not be
regarded as affecting subsequent developments."
The Court of Appeals said:
"The case seems to be narrowed to this one question: Where the
employees of a business or industry have organized and concluded a
collective contract with the employer in relation to their wages, hours
of labor, and working conditions, may a general labor union, to which
none of the employees have belonged, picket the place of business?"
It then proceeded to answer its question in the negative.
It is submitted that if this court had simply said that they
would not tolerate strikes, boycotts, picketing, or the like, of an
employer in controversies arising out of jurisdictional disputes
on the part of two or more labor unions, whether local or
national, this case would have been a distinct contribution to
legal theory. Such a decision could have been based on the
theory that such activity as found in this case was in the nature
of a secondary boycott, directed against fellow workers in a
rival union, through pressure on their employer, and as such
is illegal according to the law of[ Kentucky.
The germ of such a decision does lie in the case. It is
found in those expressions on the part of the court to the effect
that workers must be guaranteed the right of freedom to choose
who their representatives should be.95
9 Unfortunately, the court weakened the import of such state-
ments by citing as authority for same, case law and statute law, aimed
not at interference by unions with unions or laborers, but at interfer-
ence by employers with union activity. For instance, the Court cited
the National Labor Relations Act as authority for Its conclusion, say-
ing: "Though that statute, as we have said, is in no respect applicable
to this case, we are justified in accepting it as placing the legislative
stamp of legitimacy upon company unions and the decisions of the
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The most important rule laid down by this case appears in
the following:
"Under the modern concept that a company union may speak for
Labor, it cannot be said that an employer who has dealt with it freely
and fairly is unfair to organized labor. And if not unfair, then the
picketing of his place of business by a rival group, to its detriment
(as was proven in this case), was illegal and the employer is entitled
to the protection of the law."
It is submitted that this conclusion, in so far as it forbids rival
bona fide labor unions from indulging in measures that work
Supreme Court as judicial sanction of such as authorized representa-
tives of Labor. These declarations confirm the view that dealings with
a company union is a fair labor practice,
Your attention is directed to Sec. 8 (2) of the N.L.R.A. where it is
stated that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer ". . . to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administering of any labor
organization or contribute any financial or other support to it". In
Matter of Ansin Shoe Manufacturing Co. (1 N.L.R.B. 929), the purpose
of section 8 (2) was said to be: "to prevent the rights of employees
from being hamstrung by an organization which has grown up in
response to the will and purpose of the employer, an organization which
would not be, In the sense of section 7, an organization of the employees'
choice. The workers may be aware of their employer's antipathy to
union organization and seek to propitiate him by acceptable conduct.
This may be unavoidable. But the employer can be prevented from
engaging in overt activity calculated to produce that result. If labor
organizations are to be truly representative of the employee's interest,
as was the intention of Congress as embodied in this Act, the words
'dominate and interfere with the foundation of any labor organization'
must be broadly interpreted to cover any conduct upon the part of an
employer which is intended to bring into being even indirectly, some
organization which he considers favorable to his interest." With this
interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act by the National
Labor Relations Board in mind, turn to the facts before the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, as stated in the opinion: ". . . During his (the
labor union representative) negotiations with Miller to unionize his
restaurant, he and another were permitted to come there and solicit
the employees to join the union. It apppears that excepting the pro-
vision for a 'closed shop', the proposed terms were agreeable to the
appellee. There is a conflict in the testimony as to whether Miller
opposed the movement. However, we think the weight of the evi-
dence is that he left to the employees what action should be taken after
having stated what he deemed to be the advantages and disadvantages
of joining the union-perhaps emphasizing the disadvantages. During
this period, in which several conferences were held, the employees
suggested that they should organize an independent group, or what is
commonly called a company union. Miller agreed and they effected
such an organization. A written contract respecting their relations
was made by the group and Miller. It may be said here that before
this was done the only employee who had belonged to the appellant
union was discharged by Miller. .... " It is submitted that it would
seem very unlikely that the N.L.R.B. if this were a case under its
jurisdiction, would have reached the same conclusion as did the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, with respect to the position of this company
union as an independent bargaining agency.
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injury to an employer who has dealt with one of them in good
faith, is a step towards the establishment of a sound public
policy. There would seem to be no valid reason for allowing
arguments arising out of jurisdictional disputes between rival
labor groups to be carried so far as to cause injury to innocent
third parties.
This case is also authority for the view that picketing for
the purpose of establishing a "closed shop" is unlawful. Here
is direct evidence of the importance of the "ends" for which
organized labor is working. Picketing, which the Court of
Appeals said was proper where the "end" involved was valid,
is illegal where the "end" is considered unlawful.
Lastly, the court held that there was no labor dispute under
the facts of this case. 96
In conclusion, it may be said that more labor law has been
made in Kentucky in the injunction suits than in all other types
of litigation put together. It will be seen from the foregoing
that much remains to be decided; that abuses do exist; that, per-
haps, legislation, carefully drafted after diligent study, should
be enacted to make more certain the rights of employers, organ-
ized employees and other employees, and in addition, to safe-
guard the rights of the great body of citizens who make up the
"public'"-a group too frequently neglected in the economic
struggle between individuals, alone or in combination.
RECENT CRmInNAL ACTIONS IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
In 1932, in Cobb v. Commonwealth,9 7 the Court of Appeals
sustained the conviction of one Cobb, charged with the crime of
banding and confederating together, for the purpose of intimi-
dating, alarming or disturbing any person or persons.98 The
" Attention is directed to the following cases, in which the courts
have held that a case involves or grows out of a labor dispute within
the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (47 U.S. Stat. 70,c. 90) and
various state anti-injunction statutes, even though none of the plain-
tiffs' employees are members of defendant union: Senn v. Tile Layers'
Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937); Cinderella
Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich.,
1934); Dean v. Mayo, 8 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. La., 1934); Dr. Lietzman v.
Radio Broadcasting Station W.C.F.L., 282 Ill. App. 203 (1935); Restful
Slipper Co. v. United Shoe and Leather Union, 116 N.J. Eq. 521, 174
Atl. 543 (1934).
, 242 Ky. 424, 46 S.W. (2d) 776 (1932).
-Ky. Stat. 1241-a-1.
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facts were as follows: A miner's strike was in progress. One
Hioffman, age 71, had refused to quit work. One night he was
taken out, whipped, and threatened with death unless he
promised to quit working. Hoffman was able to identify Cobb
as one of his assailants. The evidence brought out that Cobb
was a union sympathizer, that union meetings were held in his
store, and that the whipping of Hoffman was a direct result of
union activities in furtherance of the strike.
The success of the Commonwealth in this case led to several
additional attempts to make use of this device in trouble arising
out of labor disputes.
The first case in this group was Alsbroo- v. Common-
wealth.90 A strike was in progress. Alen attempted to go to work.
They were prevented, and persuaded, not to do so. Actual phys-
ical damage was done to the property of one man who attempted
to crash the picket line, consisting of between twenty-five and
forty men. The language of the Court of Appeals in this case is
significant:
"The case fundamentally presented a direct conflict between the
rights of the appellant and the rights of the Love boys, both safe-
guarded by the law. As said in the case of Commonwealth v. Morton,
140 Ky. 631, 131 S.W. 506, 508, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 454: 'The right to
live in peace and quiet, and pursue according to his own inclinations
such lawful employments as he pleases, is one of the highest privileges
of the citizen. It is one of the inalienable rights guaranteed to him by
the Constitution that no man or set of men can abridge or deny. Every
citizen of the commonwealth is entitled to be protected in the peace.
able enjoyment of any legitimate business or occupation he is follow-
ing. He has a right to pursue his vocation or employment without
molestation, or threat, or violence. . . . No person or persons have
the right to undertake to compel him by threat or intimidation to leave
his house, or abandon his business or calling, or to alarm or disturb
him in the quiet possession of either.'"
"On the other hand, men engaged in a lawful strike as was the
appellant and his associates have a lawful right to assemble and to
address their fellow men and to endeavor in a peaceful, reasonable
and proper manner to persuade them regarding the merits of their
cause, and to enlist sympathy, support and succor in the struggle for a
betterment of working conditions, or for higher wages, or for the
advancement of their interests."
In the same year, in the case of Newton v. Commonwealth,100
this fact situation came before the Court of Appeals. A strike
was in progress at the Brownsville mine. A group of strikers,
including Newton, formerly employees at this mine, had
- 243 Ky. 814, 50 S.W. (2d) 22 (1932).
'1 244 Ky. 41, 50 S.W. (2d) 18 (1932).
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assembled on a road leading to the company property. There
were approximately one hundred and fifty men in this group.
By means of persuasion, they successfully prevented several
would-be workers from going to the mine. No force was used,
but there was language of such a nature as fo raise fears of the
use of force. However, none of these statements could be pinned
on Newton. The facts brought out that when the strike was
called, all but three of a total of eighty-two employees quit work.
Some fifteen men later started to work, but were persuaded not
to do so. The Court of Appeals reversed Newton's conviction
below, stating that the proper instruction in such a case was:
"If you believe from the evidence that the defendant, Henry New-
ton, joined the crowd on the occasion in question solely for the purpose
of persuading the men who proposed to work not to take the place of
the striking miners, and did not do so in pursuance of a confederacy
to intimidate, alarm, or disturb them, or any of them . . you will
find him not guilty."
The latest attempt to use this section of the criminal law in
industrial strife appears in 1935, in the case of Commonwealth
v. (ompton.10 1 Compton and forty others were jointly indicted,
charged with the statutory offense of confederating and banding
together for the purpose of intimidating, alarming, and injuring
others. The fact situation of this case is rather interesting.
The scene is the mine of the Edgewater Coal Company. The
United Mine Workers of America undertook to organize
the employees of this company. There was another organization
on the grounds, commonly known as the Company Union, under-
taking to organize the same employees. A clash of opinion
developed between the two organizations, following which the
United Mine Workers of America called a general strike.
Some time after the strike had started, the United Mine
Workers, fearing that an attempt would be made by those who
were not members to go back to work, called a meeting, and at
this meeting decided to establish a picket line consisting of 100
to 300 men to persuade those who might try to go to work from
so doing. This picket line was established, and various employees
of the company were persuaded from going to the mine by the
said pickets. No force was used, but those who attempted to
pass the picket line were warned that they might be shot by men
hidden in the hills, not members of the union, but violently
-'259 Ky. 565, 82 S.W. (2d) 813 (1935).
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sympathetic to its interests. The warning was apparently
effective, and indictment of Compton, who was present as a
picket, and some of the others followed. 'In passing on the liabil-
ity of the defendant, under the charge made, the court discusses
at some length the rights of labor unions. The language should
be quoted:
"As a matter of right, members of a labor union may assemble and
agree to pursue, and pursue any legal means to gain their ends; that
Is, to use persuasive powers in a peaceable way to induce others to
Join their organization, or by the same means to persuade others not to
take their jobs, but in doing so they must keep within legal bounds.
They may not transgress the law; the acts permitted must not be
carried to the extent of violating the statute involved in this case."
This decision, along with the others in this subdivision,
makes it clear that labor organizations need have no fear of this
statutory crime, so long as they employ peaceable and proper
means in their struggle for higher standards of living in the
community.
ARSCELLANEOUS CASES INvOLvING LABOR
A. IA'b eI
United Mine Workers of Americaz v. Cromer 02 was an action
of libel arising out of the publication by the union in its news-
paper, of an article wherein the plaintiff in this case was listed
as a detestable scab and blackleg, because of his refusing to join
the union cause in a recent strike. In sustaining a judgment for
the plaintiff, the court said:
. . . It is well settled that all written words, which hold the
plaintiff up to contempt, hatred, scorn, and ridicule, and which, by
thus engendering an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking
men, tend to deprive him of friendly intercourse in society, are libelous
per se. . . . The rule that words are to be understood in mitiore
censu has been superseded. Words are now construed by the courts
in their plain and popular sense. Under this rule, the words 'detest-
able blackleg' are, we think, libelous per se."
B. Landlord and Tenant
A case decided in the Court of Appeals on February 17,
1939, namely, Coldiron v. Good (oaZ Co.,10S presents an interest-
ing situation arising out of an industrial dispute. The case arose
out of a forcible entry and detainer proceeding by the coal
2 2159 Ky. 605, 167 S.W. 891 (1914).
'"-Ky. 
-, 125 S.W. (2d) 757 (1939).
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company against the defendant. The pleadings show that the
defendant was an employee of the plaintiff company, as a coal
miner; that he leased a house from plaintiff "for a term to con-
tinue so long as the lessee shall labor for the lessor"; that there-
after defendant was discharged; that when he failed to leave the
house, this proceeding was instituted. The defendant insists
that he was wrongfuly discharged by the plaintiff, that is, for
engaging in union activities; and that this is an unfair labor
practice over which the National Labor Relations Board has
exclusive jurisdiction. On a demurrer to the defendant's
answer which was sustained, and upon refusal of defendant to
plead further, judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The
court said:
"The fact that appellant alleges that he was discharged for union
activity and that this allegation is admitted by the demurrer Is' not
controlling for, as pointed out above, we are without jurisdiction to
examine into the propriety of his discharge and even if the allegation
were denied we would not be authorized to hear evidence thereon.
The issue thus tendered would not be triable elsewhere than before the
Labor Board. It is only by a finding of that board that it can be deter-
mined whether or not appellant is still an employee. His mere allega-
tion of unlawful discharge certainly does not accomplish this purpose.
The allegation that he is discharged is sufficient to show that the lease
is terminated and he is therefore guilty of the detainer. If, in fact,
appellant is not discharged, only the Labor Board can say so. Obvious-
ly, we are concerned here solely with the relationship of landlord and
tenant and not of master and servant. It is true that the tenancy under
this contract is so far a mere incident to the employment that we
would deem the finding of the Labor Board if one existed to be per-
tinent to the question of continuance of the term of the lease.
"However, the Labor Board is given no power to grant or refuse
a forcible detainer and the state courts are given no power to examine
into the motives for appellant's discharge. The two bodies move in
different orbits. Nothing that we may say here could preclude action
by the Labor Board within its exclusive jurisdiction. To determine
that appellee was without right to bring this proceeding would be to
deny it all relief so long as appellant chose to remain on the premises
and make no application to the Labor Board. A determination to this
effect, if appellant has in fact not been improperly discharged, would
thus result in placing a burden upon appellee's business whether it be
interstate or intrastate which was certainly not intended by the
National Labor Relations Act."
This case is another example of the reason why lawyers and
laymen in this Commonwealth must familiarize themselves with
the whole field of labor law. Federal legislation in this field
causes repercussion in many places, creating new problems for
the courts, the lawyers, the legislature and the people of this
Commonwealth. to solve.
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Tan PROTECTION OP UNION PROPERTY
In this discussion of the development of labor law in Ken-
tucky, there is plenty of evidence pointing to an early recog-
nition in this Commonwealth of the rights of organized labor.
Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in the measures that
have been taken to protect union property. In the year 1890, a
statute was enacted for the "Protection of label or brand--of
Union or Labor Association".104
In 1897, in the case of Hetterman v. Powers,10 5 a group of
cigar workers, as individuals, and as members of a cigar makers'
union, brought an action to restrain Hetterman Bros. from using
a certain cigar label, claimed to be the property of the union, on
cigars manufactured by said Hetterman Bros. The defendant
attacked plaintiff's claim on the ground that the label was not a
trade-mark, and, therefore, not a proper subject for the relief
requested. This case started, it should be pointed out, before
the statute above mentioned, went into effect. The court noted
this and pointed out that the adoption of the statute did not
change, but merely codified the common law rule. Said the
court, in granting the relief requested by the plaintiff union:
"And, first, we may admit that the label is not used as a trade-
mark, in the ordinary sense of that word. . . . But we cannot
agree, on that account, that it does not represent a valuable right,
which may be the subject of legal protection. . . . Hence it is indis-
putable that the employee, whose skilled labor in the production of a
particular commodity creates a demand for the same that secures for
him higher, remunerative wages, has as definite a property right to the
exclusive use of a particular label, sign, symbol, brand or device,
adopted by him to distinguish and characterize said commodity as the
product of his skilled labor, as the merchant or owner has to the
exclusive use of his adopted trade-mark on his goods. . .
The court held:
"On the whole case, therefore, we are of the opinion that the law
may be justly invoked by organized labor to protect from piracy and
Intrusion the fruits of its skill and handiwork, and that brain and
muscle may be the subjects of trade-law rules, as well as tangible
property."
Many years later, in S&ulsberry v. Coopers' Internationa7
Union,1'0 an action was brought by an employer to force the
11 1890, vol. 1, c. 823, p. 99, par. 1, 2, 3, 4; now, Ky. Stat. Sec. 4749-
4752. In 1894, c. 46, p. 68, par. 1, 2, 3, which are now Ky. Stat. Sees.
4753-4755, were added.
102 Ky. 133, 43 S.W. 180 (1897).
147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
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union, -with whom he had failed to agree on wages, to allow him
to use the union stamp on his products. The court refused the
request, saying:
"The stamp belonged to the union, and they took it away when
they quit plaintiff's employ. It was the sign by which the business
world was advised that the goods manufactured were union made, and
the plaintiff had no right to its use except when his goods were made
by union labor."
From these two cases it seems only fair to conclude that the
Kentucky Court of Appeals is as astute to protect the property
of organized labor as it is to protect the property of any other
person or thing within its jurisdiction.
TEE RIBGT or OP.GAmzZE LABOR To BanUG SUIT
Most, if not all, labor organizations are mere voluntary
associations. As a result, the question arises-May such a
voluntary association bring suit in its own name ? The Kentucky
Code of Practice in Civil Cases makes no provision for suits by
or against voluntary associations in their own names.10 7 Turning
to the case law, therefore, we find that the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has considered this question on several occasions.
In Hetterman v. Powers,10 an action was brought by a
group of individuals suing for themselves and all their asso-
ciates and fellow members in two different unions. These unions
were also plaintiffs in the suit, which was fo restrain use by the
defendant of plaintiffs' union stamp. The defendant, by way of
defense, averred:
"That the membership is an ever-changing one, constantly varying
in numbers, composed of few thousand today, and many thousand
tomorrow, . . . 'a shifting crowd'; that the plaintiffs, therefore,
are not qualified to sue, and have, in fact, no legal rights that can be
made the subject of a suit."
In answer to this defense, the court said, after citing a
statute enacted after this suit was filed, giving to a union the
right to sue to protect misuse of the union stamp :100
"This suit was filed before the adoption of this statute, but it indi-
cates the policy of the law.
2-I Your attention, however, Is directed to Ky. Stat. Secs. 4750-4761,
which provide that a union or association of working men and women
may bring suit to enjoin improper use of a union label, etc., registered
under that act.
"'102 Ky. 133, 43 S.W. 180 (1897).
"I See footnote 107 supra. See also the section in this article on
Protection of Union Property.
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"On the whole case, therefore, we are of opinion that the law may
be justly invoked by organized labor to protect from piracy and
intrusion the fruits of its skill and handiwork ..
It would seem that this ease must be limited to its particular
facts in so far as it appears to sustain the right of an unin-
corporated labor association to bring suit in its own name. The
decision one year later in Nichols v. Bardwetl Lodge No. 179
I.O.O.F.110 points that way. In this case the court said, with
respect to the right of an unincorporated association to sue in its
own name:
"While parties to an action may be either natural or artificial,
they must be real, and not fictitious; and a mere voluntary associa-
tion has not the power to sue in the name of the association."
And almost conclusive evidence that such is the law in Kentucky
appears in a dictum in Diamond Block Coal Company v. "Uited
Mine Workers of America,"'1 to the effect that:
"It Is a general rule that voluntary associations, such as the United
Mine Workers of America, have neither power to sue nor to be sued in
the association name, except in special cases."' 2
Tim RIGHT TO Sun A ~io ORGANIZATION IN ITS OwN NimE
In United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer,1 3 the
defendant union asked for a reversal of judgment entered
against it in the court below on the ground that it was a volun-
105 Ky. 172, 48 S.W. 426 (1898).
m188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
2" In Payne v. McClure Lodge No. 539, 115 S.W. 764 (Ky. 1909),
where the action was brought in the name and style "McClure Lodge
No. 539, Free and Accepted Masons, by W. H. Ford, Floyd Sanders,
and J. L. Sturgeon," and where defendant objected to such a method
of procedure, the court held such pleading proper, saying: ". . . An
action in the name of and for the use and benefit of a church, lodge,
society, or other unincorporated organization, may be brought in the
name of the church, lodge, society, or other unincorporated organiza-
tion by one or more of the members who are acting with the consent
or by the direction of the other members or a majority of them. (cit-
ing Ky. authority.) And unless it is made to appear that the action is
not prosecuted for the use and benefit of the persons in whose interest
it Is instituted, or that they are acting without their consent and
authority, the right to maintain it cannot be successfully disputed by
mere averments in the answer unsupported by evidence. This practice
finds ample support in section 25, Civ. Code practice, providing that:
'If the question involve a common or general interest of many persons,
or if the parties be numerous and it is impracticable to bring all of
them before the court within a reasonable time, one or more may sue
or defend for the benefit of all'."
13 1,59 Ky. 605, 167 S.W. 891 (1914).
K. L. J.-7
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tary association, and, therefore, not suable in its own name. The
Court held that:
"As we have in this state no statute authorizing a suit against
a voluntary association as such, it is doubtless true that such an
association is not suable merely in the name of the association.""'
The court then continued:
"Notwithstanding this fact, however, we take it that the question
must be raised in some proper way (i.e., by special demurrer), where
the facts appear on the face of the petition, or by answer in the nature
of a plea in abatement, where such facts do not appear."
Failure to raise the proper objection at the proper time results
in a waiver of this defense in Kentucky. Thus, in the Cromer
case, the court held that where defendant answered to the merits
without saving the question, the defense that it was not suable in
the name of the association was waived.
Recently, in Hotel, Restaurant, and Soda Fountain Em-
ployees' Local Union No. 181 v. Miller,115 the Court of Appeals
held that the defendant had waived the right to have the case
dismissed on a special demurrer to the petition for defect of
party, in that as an unincorporated association it could not be
sued under its union name, because it had, previously thereto,
entered its appearance to the suit by having moved for and
obtained a modification of a restraining order.
In conclusion, then, an unincorporated labor organization
may, by proper and timely objection, defeat any attempt to
bring suit against it in its union name, in the courts of Ken-
tucky.11 6
TRADE AGREEMENT or LABOR CONTRACT
"The process of collective bargaining results, not in a labor
contract, but in a trade agreement. This imposes no obligation
"I A similar opinion is expressed in Diamond Block Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers of America. See last paragraph of preceding
subdivision.
272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W. (2d) 501 (1938).
1
"It should be noted that as a result of the decision written by
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in the case of United Mine Workers of America
v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U.S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922), an
unincorporated labor organization is subject to suit in the federal
courts in its common name. For a recent application of this see
National Assn. of Industrial Insurance Agents v. Committee for Indus-
trial Organization, 25 F. Supp. 540 (D.C.D.C., 1938). For a discussion
of this doctrine in the federal courts for the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky, see Christian v. International Association of Machinists, 7 F.
(2d) 481 (E.D. Ky., 1925).
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upon the employer to offer or upon the laborers to accept work;
it guarantees neither to the employers workmen, nor to the labor-
ers jobs. It is nothing more than a statement of the conditions
upon which such work as is offered and accepted is to be done.
The contract of employment is still between the individual em-
ployer and the individual employee, though the provision of the
order in which men are to be taken on and laid off may give to or
withhold from laborers a chance to dispose of their services."
Thus writes Mr. Hamilton, in his article on "'Collective Bargain-
ing" in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1930).
That the process of collective bargaining, however, may
result in a labor contract, and that organized labor may validly
make such a contract, binding on both the union members, as
employees, and on the employer, is demonstrated in the decision
of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Saulsberry v. Coopers'
InternationaZl Union.117 This case involved a suit by an employ-
er to force a labor union to come to terms with him. Plaintiff
argued that many individual employees had not wanted to cease
work, that they were satisfied with the old contract, made by the
union with the employer. Said the court:
"The old contract had been made by the union. The union alone
was clothed with power to contract' for its members, and the contract,
if made at all, had to be made by the union. Hence the wish or will of
individual members cannot be considered in determining the rights of
the parties to this controversy. If the union had a right, through its
representatives, to contract, which is not denied, then the desire of
individual members cannot be taken into consideration at all, and it
is Immaterial whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the pro-
posed arrangement. The union was willing to make a contract, but it
demanded one more favorable in terms for the men than the old con-
tract. Should it be enjoined from doing so because some of the mem-
bers of the union were satisfied with the old contract? Undoubtedly,
If the officers of the union are clothed with power to represent and
speak for it, this right cannot be taken from them or abridged, except
by the union itself. It is not a matter for judicial determination at
the Instance of any one save the union."
From this, the conclusion may be drawn that a labor
union, in Kentucky, may make a contract under which it is to
furnish labor for a definite period under definite terms of
employment, and that such a contract is binding on the employer
party because of the contract, and on the employees furnished
under the contract because of their membership in the union.
This is, however, the only case of this nature in Kentucky
317147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
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which has come to my attention. It should be carefully distin-
guished from the cases to be discussed immediately hereafter.
In this case, the members of a labor organization had empowered
their organization, acting through its officers, to make a contract
which would bind them, as union members, to work under cer-
tain conditions. In the cases to follow there is no evidence of
such autbority, and, in fact, no argument that there was such
authority given. With this in mind, it can be said that in most
cases arising in Kentucky, the processes of collective bargaining
have resulted, as Hamilton suggests, "not in a labor contract,
but in a trade agreement". The Court of Appeals has, on
several occasions, considered the nature and effect of a trade
agreement.11 8
Thus, in Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co.,"19
where the court had before it the question of the nature of an
agreement between a union and an employer, it was said that
such an agreement was not a contract. The court gave as its
reason for this conclusion that the agreement was unsupported
by any consideration; that there was no offer, "for none of its
terms can be considered as a proposal.' 120
What, then, is the nature and effect of such, an arrangement
between a union and an employer ? The Hudson case suggests
that its purpose is merely to establish a usage.121 I
If an arrangement between a union and an employer is
made, with respect to wages, hours, disputes, seniority and the
like, what must an employee do in order to get the benefits of
such an agreement? If an employee, who makes a contract with
an employer, is a member of a union which has a trade agree-
ment with this employer, is that union membership enough to
118For materials on trade agreements generally, see Fuchs, "Col-
lective Labor Agreements in American Law", 10 St. Louis L.R. 1
(1925); Rice, "Collective Labor Agreements in American Law', 44
Harv. L.R. 572 (1931); Anderson, "Collective Bargaining Agreements",
15 Ore. L.R. 229 (1936).
="152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913).
"*It is submitted that an offer might be found in this,--if you pay
these wages, and establish this scale of hours, we will not strike.
Such a proposal has been held sufficient to create a binding contract
in other jurisdictions. See, for example, Johnson v. American Ry.
Express Co., 163 S.C. 198, 161 S.E. 473 (1931). Where a binding con-
tract is found, then, on the theory of third party beneficiary, the
employee is held entitled to the benefits of such union contract.
3'This theory is followed quite generally. See, for example,
Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145 Ark. 197, 224 S.W. 436 (1920);
Unkovich v. N. Y. Central R.R., 117 N.J. Eq. 20, 174 Atl. 876 (1934).
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give him the advantages of this trade agreement? The Hudson
case, supra, held that it was not. If an employee knows of such
a trade agreement, is a member of the union that made it, and
knows that this trade agreement established a usage which the
employer has adopted, will he get the advantages of such trade
agreement by merely contracting to work for the employer?
The Hudson case held that he would not.
In order to get the benefits of this trade agreement, held
the court in the Hudson case, there must be an express ratifica-
tion of the terms of the trade agreement by the employee in his
contract with the employer.
It is submitted that in so far as this case held that usage is
no part of a contract between employer and employee, it is no
longer the law in Kentucky. This is shown clearly by the
decision in Gregg v. Starks,122 where proof was offered and
accepted that a trade agreement between a union and an em-
ployer was by usage and practice considered to be a part of all
contracts of employment by and between the employer and indi-
vidual employees in the capacity under consideration. In the
Gregg case it was contended that since the plaintiff was not a
member of the union, he could not claim that the trade agree-
ment was a part of his contract of employment. The Court said:
the mere fact that the contract was negotiated between
the railroad company and an organization representing a part of its
conductors cannot exclude other conductors not members of the organ-
ization from its benefits, when the non-member conductors and the
railroad company recognized and treated it as the contract under which
the service of such conductors were rendered and accepted."
This case, therefore, establishes the rule that when a union and
an employer have signed a trade agreement, which establishes
certain usages in that trade, these usages become a part of any
contract of employment in that trade, whether the employee is a
member of the union or not, so long as it can be shown that
employer and employee recognized and considered it as a part
of the contract under which services were to be rendered and
accepted.
When a trade agreement becomes a part of a contract of
employment by the application of the rule just stated, it has
been held that the employee who receives the benefits of such
trade agreement must also abide by its burdens.123
188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920).
20 Aden v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 276 S.W. 511 (Ky. 1921).
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Thus, in Kentucky, the agreement between union and
employer known as a trade agreement is not a contract. It is a
mere usage. In order to profif by this usage, the individual
employee, be he union member or non-union member, must
include it in his contract, either expressly or by implication.
UNON NEMBERS, TEE JNiON AD Tim TRADE AGREEMENT
At times the trade agreement negotiated between an em-
ployer and a union has worked to the alleged disadvantige of a
member of the union. The resulting litigation has established
certain principles of importance in this field.
In a case before the Court of Appeals, reported as Piercy
v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co.,124 the court had this problem
to decide. Sometime before 1922 the union and defendant rail-
road had entered into a trade agreement -with respect to
seniority rights. One Stanfill, who appears to be the party plain-
tiff in this case, had a contract of employment with the defend-
ant railroad, which included seniority rights in accordance with
this trade agreement. About 1921, agitation began in the union
for a change of the existing seniority arrangement. Stanfill, a
union member, opposed this movement. However, in 1922, a
majority of the union voted to change the seniority ratings, and,
thereafter a new trade agreement, with these changes, was
accepted by the railroad. In as much as Stanfill was adversely
affected by these changes, he brings suit to protect his seniority.
The court held that a union does not have the power to waive the
personal rights of an individual member acquired under a con-
tract with a third party.
In Aulick v. Craigmyle, 25 the court held that where no per-
sonal contractual rights of a member were involved, the member
was bound by the duly constituted acts of the organization,
within the legal limits of its powers. This case arose out of a
refusal by the union to sustain certain claims as to seniority
made by the plaintiff. In as much as no contract seniority
rights by and between employer and employee were proved, the
court said that the seniority rights of plaintiff were controlled by
-198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923).
- 244 Ky. 676, 59 S.W. (2d) 560 (1933).
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the by-laws of the union, of which he was a member. The court
also pointed out that:
"In a controversy between a member and the association, the
remedies provided by its constitution and by-laws were the remedies
within the organization, and as a general rule they must be exhausted
before an appeal by a member to the courts."
In Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Harris,126 the court had occasion
to construe th.e extent to which a trade agreement becomes a
part of the contract of an individual employee and an employer.
It was shown that the trade agreement provided th]at grievances
between employer and individual employees should be heard and
determined by union tribunals, -with a right of appeal to a higher
union tribunal, and, even, an appeal from that to the authority
provided by, and existing under, the Federal Railway Labor
Act. 12 7 The plaintiff in this case was dissatisfied with the results
of his appeal to the union tribunals arising out of a disagree-
ment with his employer. The court herd that:
"The regulations of the brotherhood and its agreement with the
railway company are the sources of ascertainment of the rights of the
individual employees who are members of the brotherhood and the
usage upon which the individual contract of employment is based."
As a result, the court held that it was not within its province
to inquire into and determine the expediency or wisdom of the
union constitution or by-laws, or to interfere with the application
of same, unless it is shown that through fraudulent, arbitrary
or capricious application of such rules, the private property of
individual members was jeopardized.
The Harris case, then, is authority for the rule that where
the terms of a trade agreement provide the method of settle-
ment of disputes, an employee, claiming a right arising out of
this trade agreement, as against an employer or the union, is
bound by the decision reached in accordance with the method
provided.
In effect the decision is that the employee must take the
burdens imposed by the trade agreement, which is a part of his
contract, along with the benefits.
Finally, in Louisville & Nashville By. Co. v. Bryant,128 tbhe
Court of Appeals held that where a term in a trade agreement
was ambiguous the court would give to it that construction
-260 Ky. 132, 84 S.W. (2d) 69 (1935).
1926-45 U.S.C.A. 151, et seq.
263 Ky. 578, 92 S.W. (2d) 749 (1936).
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which the employer and the union had placed upon it, rather
than that for which the individual employee contended.
These few cases, it is submitted, establish the rule that the
extent of the rights obained by an individual contracting with
reference to a trade agreement are controlled by the terms of the
trade agreement, as construed by the parties to it, so long as
their interpretation is in good faith.128A
It is submitted that the Kentucky Court of Appeals has had
but a few of the many possible problems that can, and probably
will, arise out of the trade agreement. The question presented is
-Should the people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, through
adequate legislation, based on extensive study, point the way
to the solution of such problems, or should they wait until the
cases arise, leaving it to the courts to find the law? The one
suggests the adoption of a policy to which all could immediately
conform; the other might mean years of doubt before the courts
have a chance to speak.
LABOR LAW AND THE LEGIsiaTURE
All the labor law in Kentucky did not originate in the courts.
Frequently the legislature has expressed, by way of statute, the
policy that shall guide the courts in cases coming before them.
No attempt will be made at this time to trace the success or
failure of legislative policy in this regard. But, a history of the
enactments of the legislature, bearing directly on labor law
problems, will be essayed.
The early digests, those compiled by William Littell, 29
William Littell and Jacob Swigert, 18 0 Wickliffe and Turner and
Nicholas,18 1 and R. H. Stanton,18 2 in that order, gathered the
statutory law of Kentucky enacted prior to 1865. A careful
search of these works revealed that the legislatures of that
period were not overly interested in labor problems. Probably
the most important bit of legislation along these lines, was "An
1IA At this point, one might well turn back to the section herein
on Restraint of Trade, and consider the possibility suggested in the
last paragraph of that section as applied to the problem of this particu-
lar subdivision.
1 William Littell, "The Statute Law of Kentucky" (3 vol.), 1810;
2 additional volumes appeared between 1810 and 1815.
I" William Littell and Jacob Swigert, "A Digest of the Statute
Law of Kentucky (2 vol.), 1822.
"'Wickliffe, Turner & Nicholas, "Revised Statutes" (1 vol.) 1852.11R. H. Stanton, "Revised Statutes" (2 vol.) 1860.
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Act reducing into one, the several acts concerning Servants",
which was approved on January 16, 1798.133 This statute dealt
with indentured servants, provided for specific performance of
such contracts, for at least a seven-year period, and provided for
treatment, care, discharge, and the like, of such servants. Men-
tion has already been made of the English Statute of Conspiracy
of Victuallers and Craftsmen, which appeared in the Appendix
to volume 2 of Littell's collection.' 34
The first measure of unusual interest, so far as this study is
concerned, was enacted and approved in 1867.135 It is that
statute which, in general terms, declared that one who willfully
enticed a laborer to breach his contract of labor would be liable
for damages and fined.13 6
In 1870 the first complete and adequate lien in favor of
mechanics, laborers and materialmen was enacted and
approved.' 37 Prior to this time, some counties had such a lien
and others had none. This statute provided state-wide pro-
tection. This provision is the first bit of legislation, so far as
I could discover, passed in Kentucky, primarily for the benefit
of the laboring man.
During the year 1873, the so-called Ku Klux law was
enacted, making it a crime to unlawfully confederate together,
for the purpose of intimidating, alarming or disturbing any
person or persons, or to do any felonious act.'3 8
The first piece of legislation aimed at th.e correction of
dangerous working conditions became law in 1884. It was
entitled an "Act to provide for and regulate the ventilation of
coal mines in this State, and the better protection of miners. "139
By its terms an inspector of mines was to be appointed, and he
2William Littell, "The Statute Law of Kentucky, 1810, vol. 2,
pp. 6, 7, 8.
13 See discussion in this article under heading, Conspiracy, sub-
division B.
'11 "Acts 1867", at p. 103; Bullock & Johnson, "General Statutes of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky" (1873) at p. 341. See Ky. Stat. Sec.
1349.
I This statute has been discussed in full under the heading "Entic-
ing Labor to Abandon Contract" herein.
'" "Acts 1869-1870", at p. 100; Bullock & Johnson, ibid. pp. 620-624.
I" Bullock & Johnson, "General Statutes of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky" (1873), p. 366; approved Apr. 11, 1873. For discussion, see
section herein entitled, "Recent Criminal Actions in Industrial Dis-
putes". See Ky. Stat. 1241-a-1.
" Bullitt and Feland, "The General Statutes of Kentucky" (1887),
at p. 263-268.
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was to devote his full time to seeing that mines were properly
ventilated, that sufficient outlets were maintained, and the like.
The Act applied to all mines in which more than five men were
employed. This was the beginning. In 1888, the Act was
amended, extending the power of the inspector to check not only
ventilation, exits and air-supply, but also drainage, timbering
and general security.140 Other amendments came in course,
until today Kentucky has a comprehensive and detailed statute,
setting up the Department of ifnes and Mlinerals, providing for
innumerable exigencies. 141
In 1890, "An Act for the better protection of skilled labor
and for the registration of labels, marks, names, brands, or
devices covering the products of such labor of associations or
unions of working men or women" was enacted and affirmed.' 42
This, it is submitted, was the first legislative recognition of the
rights of organized labor in Kentucky.'4"
The Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and Statistics was estab-
lished in 1892.144 Its purpose was to collect statistics concerning
the annual production from mechanical industry and skill, the
character of labor employed in mines, factories and on the farms,
and the wages paid such employees. By an amendment in 1902,
statistics were ordered collected "concerning labor wherever
and bhowever employed in this State", including the number and
sex of such laborers, and the compensation paid them. 4 5 Before
passing, attention is called to an act of March 15, 1912, amend-
ing Ky. Stat. See. 33a-7, to the effect that labor inspectors and
their assistants must not take part in, or become involved in,
any strikes or similar labor difficulty, except in performance of
his duties.146
In 1894, the legislature enacted Ky. Stat. Sec. 1350 making
it a misdemeanor for any corporation or person or persons,
110 Act of April 6, 1888. Bullitt and Feland, "The General Statutes
of Kentucky", Appendix (1887), pp. 4-6.14'Ky. Stat. 2739-2 through Ky. Stat. 2739-55. Effective July 13,
1934; 1934 ex. s., c. 21; 1934, c. 100.
10 Bullitt and Feland, "The General Statutes of Kentucky", Second
Appendix (1888), pp. 53,54. See Ky. Stat. Sees. 4749-4755.
"'-For a discussion of this Statute, see section herein entitled
"Protection of Union Property".
'"Barbour and Carroll, "The Kentucky Statutes" (1894), pp. 183-
186. See Ky. Stat. Sec. 31, et seq.
"I Carroll, "The Kentucky Statutes", (3rd ed. 1903), pp. 193-194;
Ky. Stat. Sec. 33A.
"""Acts 1912", ch. 108, p. 304.
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having the ownership or control of any factory, mine or work-
shop in Kentucky, to pay wage-earners in anything except
money. This statute put into effect the provision See. 244 of
th.e Kentucky Constitution that wage-earners should be paid in
lawful money. It is submitted that here again we find legislation
enacted primarily for the benefit of the working group.
In this same year, 1894, a statute was enacted under which
convict-made goods were required to be marked.147  This pro-
vision was amended in 1897 to include convict-mined coal and
convict-made coke. 148 Finally, in 1937, by Ky. Stat. See. 524
through 526, provision has been made whereby convict-made
goods cannot be sold in Kentucky, whether made there or else-
where, except that such goods can be bought by wholly tax sup-
ported institutions operated by the governments of the United
States, Kentucky or any other state.1 49
The next important bit of labor law was enacted in 1898.
This statute provided how and when wages of employees in
mines should be paid, and, further, made it unlawful for any
mining employers to coerce or require, directly or indirectly,
any employee to buy supplies of any kind from any store
whatsoever.'" 0
The present Constitution of Kentucky, at section 243, makes
provision for the age at which children may be employed. The
first statute with respect to child labor in Kentucky became law
in 1902.151 It was a mild measure, merely providing that
children under fourteen could not be employed in any work-
shop, factory, or mine in the commonwealth. By an Act of
March 17, 1906, a limited protection was extended to children
above the age of fourteen, who were employed in mills, mines
and factories in the commonwealth. In 1908, the Child Labor
Laws were again amended.' 52  The list of prohibited employ-
ments for children under fourteen was extended. Children
between fourteen and sixteen were prohibited from certain
employment, unless they had an employment certificate,
approved by the superintendent of schools. A provision con-
' Barbour & Russell, "The Kentucky Statutes" (1894), pp. 524-526.
18 Carroll, "The Kentucky Statutes", (3rd ed. 1903), pp. 340-341.
1' 1936, 4th ex. s., c. 16, p. 133.
u' Caldwell, "Annotated Supplement to the Kentucky Statutes,
Edition 1894" (1899), p. 69. See Ky. Stat. Secs. 2738r-1 and 2738r-2.
m Carroll, "The Kentucky Statutes" (3d ed., 1903), p. 284.
112 Carroll, "The Kentucky Statutes" (4th ed., 1909) pp. 299-304.
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trolling the permissible hours of labor for children under sixteen
was inserted. It provided a sixty-hour week, with a maximum
of ten hours in any one day, and prohibited such labor between
seven P.M. and seven A.M. Sanitary provisions were also
included. This statute showed a marked increase in the number
and kinds of safeguards thrown around children. Further
extensions of prohibited types of work, to various age groups of
children, appeared in a new child labor law, adopted in 1914.158
It will be noted that the first regulation of hours of labor
through act of the Kentucky legislature, was in the field of child
labor. This was followed in 1910 by an act which provided
that eight hours shall constitute a day for laborers and mechanics
employed on all public works in the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky.154 Then in 1912, an "Act to regulate the employment of
females in order to safeguard their health" became law.155 The
hours of work of females under twenty-one years of age was
limited to sixty hours in any one week, with a maximum of ten
in any one day, unless such female were a nurse or a domestic
servant. For females over twenty-one, the hours of work were
restricted to similar hours in certain specified employment. The
act also required that seats be provided for female help, that
proper rest rooms be maintained, and that records should be
kept.
But, with this group of statutes, the legislature stopped.
So far as I know, no statute has ever been enacted in this state
setting up a schedule of maximum hours of labor for men.
Adverse decisions by the courts in other jurisdictions on such
regulations were probably the reason. Is that reason still valid
today? The people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky know
the answer.
Returning to our historical survey, the next important
development was the passage of a Workmen's Compensation Act
in 1914.156 This statute was declared unconstitutional in
Kentucky State Tourn c2 Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
33Thum, "Supplement to 1909 Kentucky Statutes" (1915), p. 55.
See Ky. Stat. Sec. 326, et seq.
'-"Thum, "Supplement to 1909 Kentucky Statutes" (1915) p. 489;
"Acts 1910", c. 123, p. 344. See Ky. Stat. Sec. 2290b-1.
"'Thum, "gupplement to 1909 Kentucky Statutes" (1915), p. 444;
446; "Acts 1912", c. 77, p. 232. See Ky. Stat. Sec. 4866b-1 through
4866b-8.
"u Thum, "Supplement to 1909 Kentucky Statutes" (1915), p. 1174;
"Acts 1914", c. 73, p. 226.
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Board.157 Undismayed, the legislature passed a new Workmen's
Compensation Act in 1916.158 And, in Greene v. Caldwell,159
the Court of Appeals held that the new Act was constitutional.
The statute was amended in 1918.160
During the period from the end of the World War until
some time after the recent depression was well under way, little
or no new legislative measures primarily for the protection of
the interests of laboring men and women were enacted. How-
ever, in recent years three important measures have become law
in Kentucky.
The first of these, which became effective on May 16, 1936,
is the Old Age Assistance Law.161 This provided for old age
assistance, under specified circumstances, at the age of sixty-five,
in the maximum amount of $15 a month.
The second, which became effective on March 5, 1938, pro-
vided for Unemployment Compensation. 162 At section 4748g-2,
Ky. Stat., appears this declaration of state policy:
. . . Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious
menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state.
Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest
and concern. . . . This act is enacted as a part of a national plan
of unemployment compensation and social security."
The third, which became effective on May 31, 1938, is
an "Act to Establish Minimum Fair Wages for Women and
Minors ',.13
These last three enactments in particular, and this whole
survey in general, point out what can be done in the way of
solving social and economic problems through a -wise and careful
legislative policy. There is no need for a feeling of antagonism
between the legislature and the courts. There is need for
cooperation, by and among, employer, employee and consumer,
the law-makers, the law-interpreters, and the law-enforcers.
There is need of careful draftsmanship within the powers dele-
gated by the sovereign people. There is need of wise, far-
161 Ky. 562, 170 S.W. 1166 (1914).
mKy. Stat. Sees. 4880-4987; Act of Alarch 23, 1916, c. 38, p. 354.
'170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916).
160 Carroll, "Kentucky Statutes", (5th ed. 1918), p. 1009-1046; "Acts
1918", c. 176, p. 690.
2Ky. Stat. Secs. 3766bb-1 through 3766bb-16; "Acts 1936", c. 94.
16Ky, Stat. Sees. 4748g-1 through 4748g-22; "Acts 1938", c. 50.
'"Ky. Stat. Secs. 4767a-1 through 4767a-20; "Acts 1938", c. 105,
p. 491.
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sighted policy. In view of the past history of labor law in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, there is good reason to anticipate
further enlightened and progressive legislation and decisions
in the future.
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